Who broke the republic?!?!
Wait ’til your founding fathers get home!
“What do you mean, ‘who broke the republic’? What republic? What’s broken?” Our republic - republic, not democracy - is broken. If you’re wondering what I mean by republic vs. democracy, you obviously haven’t read my last article:
While many events in the past contributed to the fracture, one of the most significant was the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. Put in place on April 8, 1913, the amendment changed the way the Senate is elected. If you are unfamiliar, here is the text of the amendment:
AMENDMENT XVII
Passed by Congress May 13, 1912. Ratified April 8, 1913.
Note: Article I, section 3, of the Constitution was modified by the 17th amendment.
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures…
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/amendments-11-27#xvii
“Ok, so what’s wrong with that?” First, we must understand what this amendment changed. Here is the original verbiage of Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution:
Section. 3.
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote…
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript#toc-section-3-
I’m sure you can spot the difference. The Seventeenth Amendment changed the way Senators are elected, from being chosen/appointed by the State legislatures to being elected directly by the people. “What difference does that really make?” It is huge. It fundamentally changed the republic.
When the founding fathers set about creating a new form of government, they sought ways to balance the potential pitfalls that might arise. The separation of powers embodied in having executive, legislative, and judicial branches helps bring balance and prevent one branch becoming tyrannical or running roughshod over the others. Likewise, the founders instituted a bicameral (two house) legislature in order to prevent the factions that could arise if only one house existed, to avoid the potential of a simple majority of the people running roughshod over any minority. As explained by The Bill of Rights Institute:
…each branch represents distinctly different interests and is given specific powers and responsibilities that correlate with these interests. The legislative branch, for example, represents citizens (House of Representatives) and the states in which they reside (Senate), and is given the power to make law, raise taxes, declare war, and regulate commerce. The executive branch represents the interests of the nation, and as such is given the power to command the military, make treaties, and appoint ambassadors. Lastly, an example of judicial branch empowerment is through judicial review, to preserve the rule of law rooted in our Constitution and the laws enacted by Congress. This functional separation of powers is reinforced through a complex system of checks and balances that allows each branch to limit the reach and authority of the others serving to limit both passionate willfulness on the part of the people and the power of the government itself.
The House of Representatives was set up to represent the people. The Senate, on the other hand, was set up to represent the States. The people will always seek after their own interests; those that benefit the state may be far different. Having many representatives each serving a smaller number of people, then two people speaking for each State provides a crucial counterbalance. The larger part of the population can become factious, and dividing it into smaller districts to be represented helps minimize the impact of a particular faction. Still, cross-district factions could form, thus having the Senate to balance the House of Representatives is important. The Senate represents the state legislature, which, though elected by the people, in its composition may not directly reflect factions that form among the populace. Therefore, having the legislature select two representatives for the Senate can stabilize ill effects arising from any particular faction. I’ve repeated the word “faction” several times now. This is not without reason. James Madison, in The Federalist 10 wrote:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The founding fathers were very concerned with any kind of faction, whether majority or minority, being able to exert undue influence over governance. They sought, in designing this new experiment, a mitigating factor for this threat to liberty. Madison further wrote:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
This in part is why the founding fathers opposed democracy and chose to create a republic. Madison intimated:
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.
The idea, as I stated earlier, was striking a balance. They realized that a pure democracy would quickly devolve into mob rule and would also result in a state that looks far more like communism than the America we have known these two centuries. The solution?
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
The founders wished to avoid the influence a faction or factious leader could have on governance. They desired to avoid oppression by diluting representation in a way that could not, without particular collusion, create the ravages of a typical democracy. Having the Senate elected by state legislatures did just that. By overriding this founding principle, and resorting to the people voting directly for their Senators, the Seventeenth Amendment created in essence a mono-cameral super-legislature. The balance afforded by separating the representation of the people from the representation of the states was fractured by this ill-conceived modification. The people had clamored for this change due to some pitfalls of the legislature-based election, such as inability to fill vacancies when legislatures could not come to agreement on appointees, and legislatures conceding to outside financial influence in their selection of Senators. Unfortunately, the pitfall of kowtowing to special interests emerged even more powerfully by moving the elective process out of the State capitols. Now both Representatives and Senators can be bought and paid for with one fell swoop, where prior such situation was made more difficult. Now factions wield more influence with no compensatory difference between the election of Representatives and Senators.
While concern over some of the dilemmas posed by the original system were legitimate, in this case, as Madison intimated, the “remedy…was worse than the disease.” We now have a Congress that has lost direction, much of which is due to those in Congress being bought and paid for by wealthy individuals and special interests. While I believe the bureaucracy (a topic for another time) is perhaps an even bigger concern than Congress, we must restore balance to the Republic. The Seventeenth Amendment must be repealed if ever we are to repair the Republic. Were our founding fathers to return , we certainly would receive a harsh punishment for what has become of the Republic they left us.
Love the title, especially the subtitle. Childhood memories!